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Sleeping	Beauty	goes	to	the	lab:	The	psychology	of	self-locating	evidence	
Abstract.	Analyses	of	the	Sleeping	Beauty	Problem	are	polarised	between	those	that	advocate	the	
“1/2	view”	and	those	that	advocate	the	“1/3	view.”	One	source	of	disagreement	between	
advocates	of	different	views	concerns	the	evidential	relevance	of	self-locating	information.	Unlike	
halfers,	thirders	regard	self-locating	information	as	evidentially	relevant	in	the	Sleeping	Beauty	
Problem.	The	present	study	advances	the	debate,	providing	a	more	nuanced	and	empirically	
grounded	account	of	the	evidential	impact	of	self-locating	information.	By	systematically	
manipulating	the	kind	of	information	available	in	different	formulations	of	the	Sleeping	Beauty	
Problem,	we	show	that	human	reasoners	acknowledge	self-locating	evidence	as	relevant,	but	
discount	its	weight.	This	indicates	that	patterns	of	judgment	on	different	formulations	of	the	
Sleeping	Beauty	Problem	do	not	fit	either	the	“1/2	view”	or	the	“1/3	view.”	Our	results	suggest	
that	an	adequate	explication	of	the	evidential	relevance	of	self-locating	information	should	take	
into	account	that	self-locating	information	may	trigger	more	cautious	judgments	of	confirmation	
than	familiar	kinds	of	statistical	evidence.	
Keywords:	sleeping	beauty	problem;	probability;	reasoning;	self-locating	evidence.
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Sleeping	Beauty	goes	to	the	lab:	The	psychology	of	self-locating	evidence	
Introduction	
The	Sleeping	Beauty	Problem	(SBP)	is	a	challenging	puzzle	in	probabilistic	reasoning.	It	raises	
questions	of	unsuspected	theoretical	relevance	for	the	foundations	of	probabilistic	reasoning,	
belief	update,	decision-making,	and	beyond	(Titelbaum,	2013).	
In	its	standard	formulation,	the	problem	goes	as	follows:	
On	a	Sunday,	some	researchers	are	going	to	put	you	to	sleep.	During	the	two	days	that	your	sleep	will	last,	
they	will	briefly	wake	you	up	either	once	or	twice,	depending	on	the	toss	of	a	fair	coin	(Heads:	once;	Tails:	
twice).	After	each	waking,	they	will	put	you	back	to	sleep	with	a	drug	that	makes	you	forget	that	waking.	
When	you	are	awakened,	to	what	degree	ought	you	believe	that	the	outcome	of	the	coin	toss	is	Heads?	
(Elga,	2000;	see	Piccione	&	Rubinstein,	1997	Example	5	for	the	original	formulation)	
Opinions	on	this	puzzle	are	split	between	two	camps.	For	so-called	halfers,	your	credence	in	Heads	
should	be	1/2	on	the	probability	scale.	At	the	outset,	you	know	all	the	details	of	the	experiment,	
including	that	the	coin	is	fair	and	that	you	will	lose	your	memory	of	an	earlier	awakening.	When	
you	wake	up,	all	new	information	you	have	is	the	self-locating	information	‘I	am	awake	now.’	Self-
locating	information	(aka	‘centred	information’)	concerns	one’s	spatio-temporal	location	in	the	
world	or	one’s	identity—such	as	the	information	‘Today	is	Monday	or	Tuesday,’	or	‘I	am	Jun.’	
Instead,	non-self-locating	information	(aka	‘uncentred	information’)	—	such	as	the	information	
‘The	coin	landed	Tails’	or	‘Jun	was	born	in	Nanjing’	—	concerns	what	the	world	is	like.	Self-locating	
information	bears	no	relevant	connection	to	the	outcome	of	the	coin	flip,	according	to	the	halfer.	
Since	before	the	experiment	you	know	that	the	coin	is	fair,	you	should	then	retain	a	credence	of	
P(Heads)	=	P(Tails)	=	1/2	(Lewis,	2001;	Arntzenius,	2002;	Cozic,	2011;	Hawley,	2013).	
So-called	thirders	disagree	and	submit	that	your	credence	in	heads	should	be	1/3.	The	pair	{It	is	
now	Monday}	and	{It	is	now	Tuesday}	partitions	your	space	of	centred	possibilities.	When	you	
wake	up,	the	pieces	of	information	on	which	you	can	rely	are	‘I	am	awake	and	it	is	now	Monday’	
and	‘I	am	awake	and	it	is	now	Tuesday.’	Since	these	pieces	of	information	are	jointly	exhaustive	
and	mutually	exclusive,	you	may	have	three	distinct	self-locating	beliefs:	
	 	 H1:	It	is	now	Monday	and	the	fair	coin	landed	Heads.	
	 	 T1:	It	is	now	Monday	and	the	fair	coin	landed	Tails.	
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	 	 T2:	It	is	now	Tuesday	and	the	fair	coin	landed	Tails.	
By	the	law	of	total	probability,	it	follows	that	P(Heads)	=	P(Heads	|	It	is	now	Monday)	x	P(It	is	now	
Monday)	+	P(Heads	|	It	is	now	Tuesday)	x	P(It	is	now	Tuesday)	=	1/2	x	2/3	+	0	x	1/3	=	1/3.	Your	
credences	should	then	be	P(Heads)	=	1/3	and	P(Tails)	=	2/3	on	any	particular	awakening	(Elga,	
2000;	Dorr,	2002;	Weintraub,	2004;	Titelbaum,	2008).	
Disagreement	on	SBP	persists,	partly	because	it	is	unclear	whether	or	not	self-locating	information	
is	evidentially	relevant	to	credences	about	uncentred	hypotheses.	Thirders	believe	that	learning	
new	self-locating	information	in	the	SBP	impacts	your	credences	about	the	outcome	of	the	coin	
flip	(e.g.,	Horgan	2004;	Weintraub	2004;	Titelbaum	2008;	Draper	2013).	Halfers	believe	that	self-
locating	information	is	evidentially	irrelevant	to	uncentred	hypotheses;	and	so	it	has	no	evidential	
impact	on	your	credences	about	the	outcome	of	the	coinflip	(e.g.,	Lewis	2001;	White	2006;	
Bradley	2012;	Hawley	2013).	
Epistemologists	and	philosophers	of	science	have	developed	several	probabilistic	explications	of	
the	concept	of	evidential	relevance	(Fitelson	1999;	Crupi	2015).	One	way	of	evaluating	the	
adequacy	of	these	alternative	explications	is	to	examine	their	degree	of	similarity	to	ordinary	
usage	and	judgment	(Carnap	1950;	Kemeny	&	Oppenheim	1952).	To	the	extent	that	an	explication	
will	only	illuminate	a	concept	if	it	fits	central	cases	of	ordinary	usage	and	judgment,	empirical	
results	from	the	psychology	of	reasoning	bear	on	philosophical	questions	about	the	evidential	
relevance	of	self-locating	information	in	the	SBP	(cf.,	Schupbach	2015;	Colombo	2016;	Tentori	et	
al.	2007).	Psychological	results	will	provide	philosophers	with	data	helpful	to	discover	and	assess	
instances	of	concept	pluralism	underlying	an	explication;	they	can	help	philosophers	to	identify	
the	explicandum’s	central	features	and	their	relation	with	other	concepts;	and	they	can	point	to	
sources	of	bias	affecting	philosophers’	judgments	about	such	an	unusual	case	as	the	SBP	
(Shepherd	&	Justus	2014).	
With	the	studies	reported	here,	we	bring	Sleeping	Beauty	to	the	lab	for	the	first	time,	so	as	to	gain	
a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	the	evidential	impact	of	self-locating	information.	Our	results	
indicate	that	an	adequate	explication	of	the	evidential	relevance	of	self-locating	information	
should	take	into	account	that	self-locating	information	may	trigger	more	cautious	judgments	of	
confirmation	than	familiar	kinds	of	statistical	evidence.	
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Overview	of	the	experimental	scenarios	
For	our	study,	we	adapted	the	standard	SBP	to	make	it	as	transparent	as	possible	to	naïve	
participants,	as	follows.		
	
BASIC	version	
On	a	Sunday,	you	will	be	administered	one	of	two	pills,	depending	on	the	toss	of	a	fair	coin	(HEADS:	regular	
pill;	TAILS:	strong	pill).	You	will	not	be	told	the	outcome	of	the	coin	toss,	and	the	two	pills	look	identical.	
However,	you	know	the	following.	
If	the	coin	landed	HEADS:	
–	the	pill	you’re	given	on	Sunday	(regular	pill)	will	make	you	sleep	for	one	day;	
–	then	you	will	wake	up	(on	Monday).	
If	the	coin	landed	TAILS:	
–	the	pill	you’re	given	on	Sunday	(strong	pill)	will	make	you	sleep	for	one	day;	
–	then	you	will	wake	up	a	first	time	(on	Monday),	and	shortly	afterwards	fall	back	asleep	for	another	day,	
forgetting	that	you	just	woke	up;	
–	then	you	will	finally	wake	up	a	second	time	(on	Tuesday).	
Imagine	you’ve	just	woken	up.	You	don’t	know	which	day	it	is,	and	you	do	not	know	whether	or	not	you	
have	already	woken	up	before.	You	are	now	asked	to	express	your	belief	about	the	outcome	of	the	coin	
toss	that	was	made	on	Sunday.	
	
As	anticipated,	the	halfer’s	and	thirder’s	predictions	diverge	critically	in	this	basic	version.	
According	the	thirder,	one	should	judge	P(Heads)	=	1/3	and	P(Tails)	=	2/3.	According	to	halfer,	
instead,	the	correct	answer	here	is	P(Heads)	=	P(Tails)	=	½,	just	as	in	the	following	No	Evidence	
version,	which	we	employed	as	a	control	condition.	
	
NO	EVIDENCE	version	
[same	introductory	paragraph	as	above]	
If	the	coin	landed	HEADS:	
–	the	pill	you’re	given	on	Sunday	(regular	pill)	will	make	you	sleep	for	one	day;	
–	then	you	will	wake	up	(on	Monday).		
If	the	coin	landed	TAILS:	
–	the	pill	you’re	given	on	Sunday	(strong	pill)	will	make	you	sleep	for	two	days;	
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–	then	you	will	wake	up	(on	Tuesday).	
Imagine	you’ve	just	woken	up.	You	don’t	know	which	day	it	is.	You	are	now	asked	to	express	your	belief	
about	the	outcome	of	the	coin	toss	that	was	made	on	Sunday.	
	
As	P(Heads)	=	P(Tails)	=	½	is	uncontroversially	the	correct	response	in	this	version,	participants’	
judgments	should	differ	between	the	Basic	vs.	No	Evidence	condition	in	case	they	reason	as	
thirders	and	self-locating	information	has	impact	on	their	credences.	In	order	to	gain	a	more	fine	
grained	understanding	of	the	evidential	impact	of	self-locating	information,	and	further	
disentangle	halfers’	and	thirders’	predictions,	we	relied	on	yet	another	benchmark	variant,	where	
ordinary	(non-self-locating)	and	evidentially	relevant	information	was	involved.	
	
MARBLE	version	
On	a	Sunday,	five	small,	empty,	and	closed	boxes	are	placed	in	front	of	you;	and	you	will	then	be	
administered	one	of	two	pills,	depending	on	the	toss	of	a	fair	coin	(HEADS:	regular	pill;	TAILS:	strong	pill).	
You	will	not	be	told	the	outcome	of	the	coin	toss,	and	the	two	pills	look	identical.	However,	you	know	the	
following.	
If	the	coin	landed	HEADS:	
–	the	pill	you’re	given	on	Sunday	(regular	pill)	will	make	you	sleep	for	one	day;	
–	meanwhile,	one	of	the	five	boxes	will	be	filled	with	a	marble,	then	closed	again	(the	other	four	boxes	
remain	closed	and	empty);	
–	then	you	will	wake	up	(on	Monday),	and	open	one	of	the	five	boxes	at	random.	
If	the	coin	landed	TAILS:	
–	the	pill	you’re	given	on	Sunday	(strong	pill)	will	make	you	sleep	for	two	days;	
–	meanwhile,	all	five	boxes	will	be	filled	with	five	marbles	(one	each),	then	closed	again;		
–	then	you	will	wake	up	(on	Tuesday),	and	open	one	of	the	five	boxes	at	random.	
Imagine	you’ve	just	woken	up.	You	don’t	know	which	day	it	is.	You	open	one	of	the	five	boxes	at	random:	
you	find	a	marble.	You	are	now	asked	to	express	your	belief	about	the	outcome	of	the	coin	toss	that	was	
made	on	Sunday.	
		
Like	in	the	No	Evidence	version,	the	halfer’s	and	the	thirder’s	analyses	converge	in	this	case,	
because	P(Tails)	=	5/6	(computed	as	(1*1/2)	/	[(1*1/2)	+	(1/5	*	1/2)]).	Instead,	they	critically	
diverge	as	concerns	the	comparison	with	the	following	counterpart	version:		
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PLUS	version	
On	a	Sunday,	you	will	be	administered	one	of	two	pills,	depending	on	the	toss	of	a	fair	coin	(HEADS:	regular	
pill;	TAILS:	strong	pill).	You	will	not	be	told	the	outcome	of	the	coin	toss,	and	the	two	pills	look	identical.	
However,	you	know	the	following.	
If	the	coin	landed	HEADS:	
–	the	pill	you’re	given	on	Sunday	(regular	pill)	will	make	you	sleep	for	one	day;	
–	then	you	will	wake	up	(on	Monday).	
If	the	coin	landed	TAILS:	
–	the	pill	you’re	given	on	Sunday	(strong	pill)	will	make	you	sleep	for	one	day;	
–	then	you	will	wake	up	a	first	time	(on	Monday),	and	shortly	afterwards	fall	back	asleep	for	another	day,	
forgetting	that	you	just	woke	up;	
–	the	same	will	happen	on	each	of	the	following	days,	until	you	finally	wake	up	a	fifth	time	(on	Friday).	
Imagine	you’ve	just	woken	up.	You	don’t	know	which	day	it	is,	and	you	do	not	know	whether	or	not	you	
have	already	woken	up	any	time	before.	You	are	now	asked	to	express	your	belief	about	the	outcome	of	
the	coin	toss	that	was	made	on	Sunday.	
	
The	Plus	version	tries	out	the	halfer’s	intuition	further.	According	to	the	halfer,	the	switch	from	
two	to	five	awakenings	(or	ten,	for	that	matters)	would	still	leave	the	self-locating	evidence	
irrelevant,	so	that	judgments	in	the	Plus	condition	are	expected	to	differ	from	the	Marble	
condition	but	not	from	the	Basic	(and	No	Evidence)	condition.	An	opposite	prediction	arises	from	
the	thirder’s	analysis:	responses	in	the	Plus	version	should	line	up	with	those	in	the	Marble	version	
and	differ	from	both	the	Basic	and	the	No	Evidence	variants.			
	
Table	1.	Comparison	between	the	Halfers’	and	the	Thirders’	judgments	about	the	probability	that	the	coin	
landed	TAILS	in	different	versions	of	the	SBP.	
	 No	Evidence	 Basic	 Plus	 Marble	
Halfers	 ½	 1/2	 1/2	 5/6	
Thirders	 ½	 2/3	 5/6	 5/6	
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In	summary,	we	experimentally	manipulated	the	SBP’s	formulation	as	a	function	of	the	kind	of	
evidence	available	to	human	reasoners	(Table	1).	We	thereby	addressed	three	questions	with	our	
study:	whether	human	reasoners	acknowledge	self-locating	information	as	evidentially	relevant	in	
the	SBP,	whether	the	impact	of	self-locating	information	differs	from	the	impact	of	objective	
statistical	information	like	finding	a	marble	in	a	randomly	chosen	box,	and	whether	the	standard	
halfer	and	thirder	accounts	are	empirically	adequate.	
	
Study	1	
Method.	Two	hundred	and	forty-one	participants	(Mean	age,	35,	SD	=	10,	male	137,	female	104)	
were	recruited	using	Amazon	MTurk.	We	only	allowed	MTurk	workers	with	an	approval	rate	>	95%	
and	with	a	number	of	HITs	approved	>	5000	to	participate	in	our	study.	Instructions	and	material	
were	presented	in	English	on	the	Qualtrics	Survey	Software.	Participants	were	randomly	assigned	
to	one	of	four	experimental	groups,	and	none	took	part	in	more	than	one	experiment.		
As	pointed	out	above,	four	conditions	were	sufficient	to	disentangle	relevant	predictions	from	
standard	halfer	and	thirder	accounts,	thus	putting	them	to	empirical	test.	Halfers	and	thirders	
agree	on	their	predictions	that	P(Tails)	=	1/2	in	the	No	Evidence	condition,	and	that	P(Tails)	=	5/6	in	
the	Marble	condition.	For	the	Basic	and	Plus	conditions,	instead,	halfers	and	thirders	disagree	
(Cisewski	et	al.,	2016;	see	also	Ross	2010).	Halfers	predict	that	P	(Tails)	=	1/2	in	both	the	Basic	and	
the	Plus	condition,	since	they	claim	that	self-locating	information	bears	no	relevance	relation	with	
the	outcome	of	the	coin	toss.	Instead,	thirders	predict	that	P	(Tails)	=	2/3	in	the	Basic	condition,	
and	that	P	(Tails)	=	5/6	in	the	Plus	condition	as	a	function	of	the	partition	of	centred	possibilities.	
Participants	read	one	version	of	the	SBP,	and	were	asked	to	express	their	belief	about	the	
outcome	of	the	coin	toss	in	the	situation	described	in	one	vignette.	Participants’	beliefs	were	
collected	on	a	7-point	Likert-scale	ranging	from	‘Certain	that	it	was	Heads	and	not	Tails’	to	‘Certain	
that	it	was	Tails	and	not	Heads.’	Finally,	participants	were	asked	to	indicate	their	age,	sex,	and	
level	of	education.	
Results.	A	Kruskal-Wallis	test	showed	that	each	of	our	four	manipulations	had	a	significant	effect	
on	participants’	judgment,	χ2	(3)	=	28.76,	p	=	.000.	Across	conditions,	we	also	found	significant	
differences	concerning	the	degree	of	certainty	that	the	outcome	of	the	coin	toss	was	Tails	(ranging	
in	4-7,	i.e.	from	“equally	likely”	to	“certain”),	χ2	(3)	=60.16,	p	=	.000.	A	Dunn’s	test	was	further	
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performed	to	test	all	possible	pairwise	comparisons	between	the	four	different	conditions.	The	
results	showed	that	difference	of	scores	between	Basic	&	Marble,	Marble	&	No	Evidence,	Marble	
&	Plus,	and	No	Evidence	&	Plus	were	significant	(p<0.01).	We	found	no	effect	of	age,	sex,	or	
education.	
	
Study	2	
Method.	Study	1	revealed	that	participants’	judgments	of	the	SBP	depended	on	the	type	of	
evidence	available.	In	particular,	its	results	are	consistent	with	the	idea	that	naïve	reasoners	
acknowledge	self-locating	information	as	relevant	in	the	SBP	(Plus	condition).	Study	2	examined	
whether	these	results	may	have	been	affected	by	a	focus	on	the	coin	mechanism	in	the	question	
participants	were	asked.	
A	new	sample	of	two	hundred	and	thirty-seven	participants	(Mean	age	34,	SD	=	10,	male	137,	
female	100)	was	recruited	from	Amazon	MTurk.	As	in	Study	1,	we	only	allowed	MTurk	workers	
with	an	approval	rate	>	95%	and	with	a	number	of	HITs	approved	>	5000	to	participate	in	our	
study.	Instructions	and	material	were	presented	in	English	on	the	Qualtrics	Survey	Software.	
Participants	were	randomly	assigned	to	one	of	four	experimental	groups,	and	none	took	part	in	
more	than	one	experiment.	
Unlike	in	Study	1,	participants	did	not	express	their	belief	about	the	outcome	of	the	coin	toss.	
Instead,	participants	expressed	their	belief	about	the	pill	they	were	administered	in	the	situation	
they	were	asked	to	consider.	Otherwise,	the	versions	of	the	SBP	used	in	this	second	study	were	
identical	to	the	versions	we	used	in	Study	1.	Responses	were	again	collected	on	a	7-point	Likert-
scale	and	participants	again	provided	their	age,	sex,	and	level	of	education.		
Results.	A	Kruskal-Wallis	test	showed	that	all	groups	differed	significantly	in	their	answers,	χ2	(3)	
=17.43,	p	=	.001.	All	groups	differed	significantly	in	their	certainty	of	a	Tails	outcome,	χ2	(3)	=29.18,	
p	=	.000.	A	Dunn’s	test	was	further	performed	to	test	all	possible	pairwise	comparisons	between	
the	four	different	conditions.	The	results	showed	that	difference	of	scores	between	Basic	&	
Marble,	and	Marble	&	No	Evidence	were	significant	(p<0.01).	Like	in	Study	1,	we	found	no	effect	of	
age,	sex,	and	education.	
A	Mann-Whitney	Test	showed	that	there	was	no	significant	difference	between	the	answers	of	the	
participants	of	this	study	(M	=	4.31)	and	the	answers	of	participants	from	Study	1	(M	=	4.24),	p	=	
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.83.	Aggregating	data	from	both	studies,	the	difference	between	the	Basic	and	the	No	Evidence	
condition	did	not	reach	significance,	p	=	.42.	However,	a	significant	difference	was	found	between	
the	Plus	and	the	Basic	condition,	p	=	.03,	d	=	.29,	and	between	the	Marble	and	the	Plus	condition,	
p	=	.03,	d	=	.25	(Table	2	and	Figure	1).	
	
Table	2.	Mean	scores	for	each	group	(scores	ranging	from	1	to	7).	
Conditions	 No	Evidence	 Basic	 Plus	 Marble	
Mean	 SD	 Mean	 SD	 Mean	 SD	 Mean	 SD	
Coin	(Study	1,	n	=	241)	 3.83	 .78	 3.98	 1.05	 4.40	 1.15	 4.87	 1.60	
Pill	(Study	2,	n	=	237)	 3.92	 1.04	 3.90	 1.28	 4.23	 1.71	 4.82	 1.54	
Combined	(1&2,	n	=	478)	 3.87	 .91	 3.94	 1.17	 4.32	 1.46	 4.85	 1.57	
	
Figure	1.	Mean	scores	for	each	group	(scores	ranging	from	1	to	7)	
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Discussion	
Our	results	show	that	experimentally	observed	reasoning	in	the	SBP	does	not	simply	fit	either	the	
halfer	or	the	thirder	analyses.	The	halfer’s	analysis	is	consistent	with	the	lack	of	a	significant	
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difference	between	the	Basic	and	No	Evidence	conditions,	but	is	at	odds	with	the	finding	that	the	
Plus	and	Basic	conditions	reliably	differed	(recall	that	for	the	halfer	one	should	have	P(Tails)	=	1/2	
in	both	cases).	The	thirder’s	analysis,	on	the	other	hand,	is	consistent	with	the	latter	result,	but	is	
inconsistent	with	the	finding	that	the	probability	of	Tails	is	reliably	judged	to	be	higher	in	the	
Marble	than	in	the	Plus	condition	(for	the	thirder,	one	should	have	P(Tails)	=	5/6	in	both	cases).	
Because	in	some	of	the	conditions	the	variance	was	relatively	high,	we	examined	whether	we	
could	distinguish	a	group	of	halfers	and	a	group	of	thirders	among	the	participants.	If	our	
participants	actually	included	these	two	groups,	then	the	pattern	of	responses	across	critical	
conditions	like	Basic	and	Plus	should	be	bimodally	distributed.	However,	we	did	not	find	
indications	of	a	bimodal	distribution	in	any	of	the	conditions.	
Furthermore,	our	results	seem	to	rule	out	the	possibility	that	differences	in	how	people	reason	
about	SB	do	not	depend	on	differences	in	how	they	treat	self-locating	information,	but	instead	
depend	on	different	people	having	differing	models	for	the	type	of	evidence	that	SB	will	observe	
(cf.	Cisewski	et	al.	2016).	If	the	significant	difference	that	we	found	between	the	Basic	and	Plus	
conditions	only	depended	on	the	presence	of	one	group	of	halfers	and	one	group	of	thirders	
among	our	participants,	who	would	have	differing	models	for	the	type	of	evidence	that	SP	will	
observe,	then	the	variance	of	the	responses	in	the	Plus	condition	should	be	higher	than	the	
variance	in	the	Basic	condition.	After	all,	halfers	should	respond	1/2	in	both	conditions,	while	
thirders	should	respond	2/3	in	Basic	and	5/6	in	Plus.	However,	if	there	are	actually	two	groups	
among	our	participants,	then	the	variance	in	the	Plus	condition	should	also	be	systematically	
higher	than	the	variance	of	the	responses	in	the	Marble	condition,	because,	in	this	latter	
condition,	both	halfers	and	thirders	agree	on	the	5/6	response.	Yet	again,	this	is	not	what	we	
found:	the	variance	of	participants’	responses	did	not	systematically	increase	from	the	Marble	to	
the	Plus	conditions.	So,	the	hypothesis	that	our	participants	included	a	group	of	halfers	and	a	
group	of	thirders	does	not	seem	to	account	for	our	results.			
Given	that	no	standard	theoretical	analysis	accounts	for	observed	behavior,	one	might	be	tempted	
to	complement	a	thirder	framework	with	an	appeal	to	cognitive	limitations	akin	to	those	arising	in	
other	known	puzzles	of	probabilistic	reasoning.	In	particular,	from	a	thirder’s	perspective,	the	SBP	
may	seem	structurally	similar	to	the	Monty	Hall	problem.	And	Monty	Hall	is	known	to	invite	1/2	as	
a	largely	dominant	response	because	of	the	representational	and	computational	difficulty	of	the	
task	for	the	unaided	human	mind	(Krauss	&	Wang,	2003).	Although	appealing,	this	remark	is	not	
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sufficient	to	explain	our	results	either.	After	all,	thirders	could	easily	see	that	the	Marble	and	the	
Plus	variants	have	the	same	mathematical	structure,	with	the	number	of	marbles	corresponding	to	
the	number	of	awakenings;	and	so,	they	will	provide	similar	judgments	in	both	variants.	However,	
this	is	not	what	we	found.	Our	participants’	judgments	differed	significantly	across	the	Marble	and	
Plus	condition,	which	suggests	that	our	findings	cannot	simply	be	explained	in	terms	of	
representational	difficulty	of	the	task	like	in	the	Monty	Hall	problem.	
A	thirder	would	also	be	unable	to	explain	our	results	by	relying	solely	on	a	general	tendency	to	
conservatism	in	probability	updating,	according	to	which	people’s	belief	updating	is	generally	
conservative	relative	to	the	predictions	of	Bayesian	conditioning	(Phillips	&	Edwards	1966;	
Edwards	1968;	Fischoff	&	Beyth-Marom,	1983;	Slovic	&	Lichtenstein,	1972).	The	provision	of	new	
evidence	would	then	have	less	impact	on	people’s	belief	updating	than	what	Bayesian	
conditioning	predicts.	But	this	general	tendency	to	conservativism	in	probability	updating	still	does	
not	explain	the	difference	we	found	between	judgments	in	the	Marble	and	Plus	conditions,	which	
were	structurally	analogous	from	a	general	probabilistic	point	of	view.	
Consistent	with	our	results	is	instead	the	explanation	that	people	show	a	tendency	to	
conservativism	in	specific	settings,	only	with	respect	to	specific	kinds	of	evidence.	The	idea	is	that	
our	participants	extracted	less	certainty	from	the	available	self-locating	evidence	in	comparison	to	
the	“observed”	evidence	of	the	marble	in	a	randomly	chosen	box.	This	conservativism	in	belief	
updating	with	self-locating	information	can	be	further	explained	in	a	number	of	ways	(cf.,	Edwards	
1968).	Participants	could	have	mis-perceived	the	true	evidential	impact	of	self-locating	
information,	discounting	its	weight	more	than	“observed”	evidence.	Or,	although	the	weight	of	
self-locating	information	was	perceived	in	a	similar	way	as	the	weight	of	non-self-locating	
information,	participants	might	have	applied	an	adjusted	combination	rule	to	self-locating	
information	when	revising	their	beliefs.	
Source	reliability	provides	another	factor	that	can	explain	our	results	in	a	way	that	is	consistent	
with	Bayesian	belief	update.	As	Corner,	Harris	&	Hahn	(2010)	suggest,	in	situations	where	
information	is	received	from	some	source,	people	should	not	update	their	beliefs	as	much	as	if	
they	had	directly	observed	the	evidence.	This	is	because	it	is	rare	that	people	receive	information	
from	sources	that	are	fully	reliable;	and	it	is	even	more	rare	that	people	produce	themselves	fully	
reliable	information,	on	which	they	update	their	beliefs.	Consequently,	self-locating	information	
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produced	by	oneself	could	be	diluted	to	some	degree,	in	line	with	a	Bayesian	analysis	of	source	
reliability	(Corner	et	al.	2010).	
In	summary,	our	results	are	consistent	with	a	pattern	of	judgment	that	is	qualitatively	different	
from	either	the	halfer	or	thirder	analyses,	where	self-locating	evidence	is	acknowledged	as	
relevant	but	its	quantitative	impact	is	discounted	significantly	as	compared	to	more	standard	
statistical	evidence.	Other	factors	were	previously	shown	to	have	such	diluting	effects	on	
reasoning	with	evidence,	such	as	second-order	uncertainty	about	the	values	of	a	relevant	
statistical	distribution	(Tentori,	Crupi,	&	Osherson,	2010).	Although	“mixed”	models	of	the	SBP	
exist	(Bostrom,	2007;	Meacham	2008),	they	do	not	take	into	account	this	particular	diluting,	
conservative	effect	involved	in	reasoning	with	self-locating	information.	Our	results	will	then	
contribute	to	put	analyses	of	the	SBP,	and	more	generally	of	probabilistic	reasoning	with	self-
locating	information,	on	plausible	descriptive	grounds.	
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